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Introduction 
A considerable amount of economic research, both conceptual and 
empirical, has been done on the impact of the tax structure upon investment 
decisions (Jorgenson and Stephenson, Bailey). It is a well known result of 
classical static economics that a tax on pure profits does not affect the 
optimum levels of output and inputs of a profit maximizing firm. In practice, 
however, profit taxes are not levied on pure profits. Taxable profits differ 
from pure profits in at least three ways; first, the return to equity capital 
is treated as taxable; second, owing to various investment allowances, true 
depreciation may differ from depreciation for tax purposes; and, third, capi-
tal gains are usually taxed imperfectly. 
The affects of tax structure on resource allocation within production 
agriculture have long been debated. Federal tax provisions are often 
suggested to be non-neutral with respect to the size of farm (Raup; Gardner; 
Davenport, et al.). Such non neutrality may provide either incentives or 
disincentives for farm size expansion. Further, tax provisions often favor 
one enterprise size or type more than another, thus influencing capital 
investment patterns within the agricultural sector. 
There are several features of the federal tax system which often are 
suggested to have farm size related effects. Raup has suggested that such tax 
policies as investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation, use of cash 
basis accounting, and the deductibility of interest as a business expense sti-
mulate the demand for capital items. Under certain conditions with respect to 
the supply of capital such provisions may substantially accelerate the substi-
tution of capital for labor. Further, these provisions are size related in 
that the resulting tax savings will increase with the size of the taxpayer's 
income because of the progressive tax rate structure. 
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Previous Research 
Over the last decade there has been substantial empirical work in the 
area of tax effects on agricultural production. Batte incorporated an esti-
mate of federal income tax liability as an implicit cost of production for 
cash grain producers in Illinois. His findings suggest that the effective tax 
rate is progressive, although this progressivity was small. Baker utilized 
data from tax returns of Indiana farmers to study the relationship between 
average effective tax rate and the size of farm. His results indicate that 
the use of various tax credits offset largely the progressive nature of the 
federal tax rate structure. These studies suggest that federal income taxes 
are not a major deterrent to farm size expansion for this type of producer. 
Edwards and Boehlje considered the impacts of federal income tax legislation 
upon the size of the least cost machinery set. They found that the inclusion 
of income tax effects reduced the variability of costs from year to year, thus 
reducing income tax liability over time and encouraging firm growth. 
Musser suggests contradictory results in a study evaluating economies of 
size in midwest crop production. His results suggest that the inclusion of 
taxes as an implicit cost of production reduced the size of farm at which the 
minimum average costs occurred. Musser's conclusions may be in error, 
however, because his results are based on the assumption that marginal tax 
rates increase with farm size; a conclusion largely in contradiction to the 
Batte and Baker studies. 
In addition to questions concerning the effective progressivity of the 
tax structure, the special tax treatment of capital gains may result in an 
altered resource allocation within agricultural production. Duffy and Bitney 
studied the effects of the capital gains tax provisions on hog farrowing 
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enterprises. These provisions encouraged hog producers to utilize all gilts 
for one farrowing in order to qualify these animals for capital gains tax 
treatment. Reid, Musser, and Martin studied optimal enterprise organization 
for crop-hog farms in Georgia and suggested that the inclusion of income taxes 
resulted in hog enterprises becoming a more dominant part of the farm busi-
ness, primarily because of the capital gains provision of the hog enterprise. 
Musser, Martin, and Saunders found the capital gains provision to be an impor-
tant incentive for crop farms to diversify into livestock production. 
Davenport, et al., observe that because many farm investments receive tax 
preference under income and estate tax rules, such investments will produce 
lower tax liabilities than a similar investment yielding the same rate of 
return but not having tax preferences. The extreme of such a tax shelter is 
an investment for which the present value of the tax deductions exceeds the 
investment cost. This has been referred to as a "negative tax" (Bailey; 
Hanson; Davenport, et al.). The acquisition of an asset which generates tax 
savings rather than tax obligations may substantially alter the cost/size 
relationship of farms, and may stimulate increased farm output. Also stimu-
lated will be the demand for the capital assets which contribute to the nega-
tive tax. In the long run it is reasonable to believe that the price of the 
negative tax creating asset will be bid upward sufficiently to equate the 
after-tax rate of return of this asset with those of similar assets which are 
not negatively taxed. Certainly, such a result would have structural impacts 
on the agricultural sector. 
A simulation analysis conducted by Boehlje evaluated the effect on land 
prices of the differential tax treatment for capital gains. Various other 
parameters such as leverage and holding period also were considered. Maximum 
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land bid prices were found to increase substantially as land appreciation (as 
a percent of total land return) increased. That is, as more of the earnings 
attributable to land received capital gains treatment, bid price for land 
increased. 
Hanson explored the negative tax issue by analysis of the tax liabilities 
of Minnesota farmers with combined land and machinery investments during the 
1972-78 period. Although his results were not conclusive, the expansion 
investments resulted in lower tax liabilities and higher tax shielded income 
for 7 of the 10 cases studied. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the tax consequences of an 
expansion of the farm unit, including land and machinery purchases. The 
TAXMODL simulator developed at Minnesota by Hanson will be applied to farm 
records data from another source to determine if the results suggested by 
Hanson are supported. The organization of the paper is as follows. The next 
section will present the theoretical attributes and data requirements of the 
Hanson model. Discussion of the attributes of the Illinois data set will then 
occur, followed by the results of the application of the Hanson model to these 
data. Finally, the summary and conclusions will be presented. 
The Minnesota "Negative Tax" Study 
The existence of negative taxation and its magnitude for a sample of 
farms was studied by Hanson. The theoretical model used by Hanson to develop 
his specific hypotheses departs from the traditional economic model of the 
maximization of after tax profits where it is implicitly assumed that economic 
expense equals tax deductions. In the traditional model a profits tax is 
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neutral in that it does not alter the implicit optimality rules for resource 
allocation. Instead, Hanson argues, as have many others (e.g. Bailey), that 
"there is no reason to expect that ••• the economic value of depreciation auto-
matically is equal to the depreciation tax deduction permitted by the tax 
code." 
The conceptual model follows along the line of the "tax expenditure pro-
fit maximization model." This model is stated as: 
(1) ATP = (1-t) (SR) - GW - VE - AGI(L,M) - CGT + CVWTD + CVVETD + CVCATD 
where ATP is the after tax profit, t is the effective tax rate, SR is sales 
revenue, GW is gross wages, VE is variable expense, AGI(L,M) is annual gross 
investment in land (L) and machinery (M), CG is capital gains tax, CVWTD is 
cash value of wage tax deductions, CVVETD is cash value of variable expense 
tax deductions, and CVCATD is cash value of capital asset tax deductions. All 
input costs are appropriately adjusted to reflect the prevailing tax struc-
ture. This basic model is extended to a multi-period optimization model by 
expressing ATP as the present value of after tax profits. The problem facing 
the agricultural farm firm is to choose variable and capital inputs so as to 
maximize the present value of after tax profits subject to the implicit rental 
prices and tax rates facing the firm. 
Hanson derives the solution to this optimization problem by taking the 
derivatives of APT with respect to the choice variables, Labor, Variable 
inputs, Land, and Machinery and setting these equal to zero. The implied eco-
nomic conditions generated by the Hanson model are: 
(2) dV/dN = MPP(N) = ws(l-um)/p, 
(3) dV/dE = MPP(E) c(l-um)/p, 
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(4) dV/dL = MPP(L) = [h/p(l-u)] [r(l-ud) - g(l-ul)], 
(5) dV/dM = MPP(M) = [q/p(l-u)] [r(l-k-ud) - j(l-k-uv)- a(l-k-u)] 
where w is the wage rate, s is the employer paid social security tax rate, u 
is the effective tax rate, m is the percent share of wage deduction resulting 
from cash basis tax accounting, c is the price per unit of variable expense, h 
is the per acre price of farm land, r is the effective interest rate, d is the 
debt/equity ratio, g is the appreciation rate on land per acre, 1 is the ratio 
of taxable to nominal capital gains on total capital assets, q is the co~ 
posite price for buildings and machinery, k is the rate of investment tax cre-
dit, j is the constant rate of depreciation, v is the ratio of depreciation 
tax deduction to economic depreciation, a is the appreciation rate on building 
and machine assets. 
These first-order conditions indicate that optimal input use occurs where 
the marginal product of the particular input is equated to the "tax adjusted" 
real rental input cost, not the before tax input cost. The first relationship 
indicates that labor is used up to the point where the marginal physical pro-
duct is equal to the tax adjusted real wage rate. Likewise, relationships 
(3) - (5) require that all inputs be used in the same manner. 
These optimal conditions differ from the non-tax model in the definition 
of real input costs. For example, if the tax expenditure parameters (s), (v), 
and (1) were all equal to unity, and the debt ratio (d) was also equal to 
unity, and the rate of investment tax credit (k) as well as the percent share 
of the wage deduction resulting from cash basis accounting (m) were zero, 
these conditions would reduce to those of the traditional profit maximization 
model with tax neutrality. With relevant values for these parameters the real 
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rental value of the respective inputs declines indicating that the firm should 
increase its use of these productive inputs. 
Furthermore, the optimal conditions given in (2) - (5) imply that the 
respective marginal products of each of the inputs depends upon the levels of 
the other inputs in the production process. This is important in that it 
suggests that any overcapitalization in machinery, which might occur as a 
result of more liberal tax incentives to spur the purchase of equipment, will 
necessitate an increase in the other inputs in order to maintain maximum after 
tax profits. This raises the distinct possibility that the long term impact 
of liberal tax expenditures may result in a spiral of machinery/land expansion 
and rising input prices. It should be pointed out, however, that the model 
developed by Hanson is purely static in nature and does not directly apply to 
this type of dynamic rationalization. The dynamic elements of the problem can 
only be inferred from the consideration of multiple static equilibrium points. 
It is on the basis of this conceptual model that Hanson explores the 
existence and extent of tax expenditures occurring in a sample of Minnesota 
farms. The characteristics of the non neutral tax model also lead to the con-
sideration of negative taxation of specific investment assets. In particular, 
Hanson argues that with the present tax structure in U.S. agriculture the tax 
expenditures associated with machinery investment can result in deductions 
that are greater than the cost of the investment when measured in present 
value terms. These investments, when accompanied by nontaxable income in the 
form of unrealized capital gains are negatively taxed. As was argued by 
Bailey, the existence of negatively taxed investments can have substantial 
resource misallocation effects. Hanson empirically defines negative taxation 
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as occurring when the investment in an asset actually lowers the farmers tax 
liability even though the investment is generating income. 
Defining a negatively taxed investment instrument as having three prin-
cipal attributes (i) the present value of deductions exceed cost, (ii) income 
from the investment is untaxed, and (iii) other income is available to receive 
the tax shielding benefit of the tax deductions generated by the investment, 
Hanson develops a tax simulator--TAXMODL--which is used to calculate total tax 
liabilities for a sample of Minnesota farms. Negative taxation is identified 
by first calculating the total tax liability with the land/machinery expansion 
compliment and then using a linear homogenous acres rule, subtracting revenue 
and expense attributable to the land expansion and recalculating the farm 
firm's total tax liability. If the tax liability increases in the second case 
then the land expansion assets qualify as negatively taxed investments whose 
deductions have offset other income and lowered the farm firm's tax liability. 
From a sample of 76 farms over the period 1972-78, Hanson identifies 10 
farms hich conform to a specific set of criteria proposed by Hanson as 
necessary to identify those farms with land/machinery expansions. Applying 
the TAXMODL, Hanson concludes that on the average for his sample, land and 
machinery expansion account for a reduction in taxable income of $3,525 and 
$533 in reduced tax liabilities. In reaching this conclusion, Hanson allo-
cated 68% of the allocable interest to the expansion assets. Had he allocated 
the entire amount of allocable interest to the expansion expense, the dif-
ference in pre and post expansion tax would have been $1,546 instead of $533. 
Hanson also concludes that an average of $25,790 of expansion income in the 
form of land appreciation was shielded from taxes during the sample time 
period. 
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Other significant results of the Hanson study relate to the magnitude of 
off-farm income and farm economic size. In the sample identified for the tax 
calculation the off-farm income was 40% larger on average than for the entire 
sample of 76 farms. This may suggest that negative taxation is available only 
to those in the agricultural production sector with substantial outside 
income. As for a significant correlation of negative taxation and farm size, 
none was found in the sample studied. 
Limitations of the Minnesota Study 
The results of the Hanson effort are not at all conclusive. It is likely 
that the results are sensitive to the allocation rules used to expense expan-
sion versus non-expansion items. The use of a linear homogenous acres rule to 
arrive at the magnitude of income and expense attributable to the expansion 
investment may be qustionable. Implicit in this rule is the assumption that 
for all farms studied, the productivity of the additional acres is equal to 
the average productivity of the base acreage. There is no allowance for the 
possibility that some farms may be more productive than others, and for the 
same aount of deductible investment allowances, some farms may have substan-
tially different amounts of marginal gross income relative to their 
pre-expansion base on the additional acres. Thus, this homogenous acres allo-
cation rule may bias negative taxation in favor of less productive operations. 
Also, given the fact that the income from the expansion is taken in the form 
of unrealized capital gains on land appreciation, Hanson does not address the 
question of the long term affects when land prices may rise and fall, nor does 
he consider the long term affect of the land/machinery demand on the rate of 
growth in machinery prices. 
10 
Although the results of the Hanson study are not as strong as one would 
like, taking the collective weight of the studies addressed above and the fact 
that in the Hanson study there was some evidence of the negative taxation 
phenomenon, it would be useful to explore this concept further. As Hanson 
points out, because of the sensitivity of the results to the rules used to 
allocate expenses across different enterprises, the ideal candidates for 
future tests would be grain farms with no or little livestock operations. 
Also, data from the late 1970's would be desirable. The data from the Illinos 
farm record system is very suitable to the type of analysis and may help pro-
vide additional insight into this area. 
Data Source 
The source of data for these analyses is a sample of individual cash 
grain producers drawn from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
Association (FBFM). The membership of the FBFM does not constitute a random 
sample of the larger population of Illinois farmers. The difference in these 
groups may not be great, however. Mueller compared a sample of FBFM coopera-
tors to a random sample of Illinois producers and concluded that the differen-
ces were "essentially differences in the quantity of basic resources, 
particularly land and capital utilized by the farm operators ••• and, given 
equal basic resources, managerial ability is not greatly different on record 
keeping and survey farms" (p. 292). 
There are aspects of the FBFM sample which provide improved data accuracy 
over that which could be expected from a random sample of producers. The FBFM 
records are standardized in accounting format. The accounting procedures used 
are well documented, both to the farmer-members and to the researcher. As a 
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result, the researcher has more confidence as to the content of each cost and 
receipt account. Also, field agents are available to assist members. This 
further increases the accuracy and standardization of the accounting records. 
Finally, the FBFM records provide observations for a relatively large number 
of producers for a multi-year period. 
The sample of FBFM producers available for this analysis is made up pre-
dominantly of cash grain producers. Only farms classified by FBFM field 
agents as "usable" were included. This excluded farms which were, for one 
reason or another, "non-typical" of Illinois agriculture or which were 
suspected of containing accounting errors. Also, the sample was structured to 
include only farmers for whom corn, soybeans and wheat accounted for 95 per-
cent or more of tillable acreage. Further, farm records were excluded from 
the sample if income derived from other farm sources was more than 5 percent 
of total receipts. This excluded farms with major livestock enterprises in 
addition to the cash grain enterprises, or farms with major income arising 
from such farm related activities as the provision of custom services to 
others. Finally, membership of the sample was restricted to those producers 
who were continuously enrolled in the FBFM for the five years, 1975-79. A 
result of this structuring is a sample which is very homogeneous: One which 
portrays the essential characteristics which Ranson felt important for analy-
sis of negatively taxed investments. 
A potential difficulty with the sample is that its membership is mixed 
with both owner-operators and part-owners. This is not considered to be a 
major limitation, however, because receipt and expense items were recorded 
separately for the operator and landlord entities. It did present a problem 
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in the sense that part-owner operations have the opportunity to change land 
base by means other than land purchase. 
Another deficiency to be recognized is that the FBFM records do not con-
tain information about non-farm income. For this reason it is not possible to 
identify farmers who may have substantial non-farm income to be shielded by 
tax preference items. This may be an important deficiency because the farms 
which were found by Hanson to be negatively taxed had substantially larger 
non-farm incomes that the remainder of the sample. 
The sample meeting the above restrictions contained 167 producers. 
Average farm size was 522 tillable acres with a standard deviation of 229 
acres. Farm sizes ranged from 140 to 1632 tillable acres. 
Because it is the purpose of this study to calculate the tax liabilities 
of farmers, it is necessary that substantial information concerning income, 
expenses, and depreciable investment inventories be available. Although the 
FBFM records data do not specifically include measures of the taxes paid, the 
majority of the information required for these calculations are available. 
Application of TAXMODL to the FBFM Data 
The analysis of negatively taxed investments as conducted by Hanson 
required the identification of a sample of producers who had expanded the 
land/machinery complement. Starting with an initial sample size of 76 
Minnesota producers for the period 1972-78, Hanson applied the following cri-
teria for case selection: 
1. Tillable acres purchased must be greater than or equal to 40. 
2. Purchase of expansion land must increase total acres farmed. 
3. Cases with large purchases of feeder cattle were excluded. 
4. Cases with frequent changes in acreage were excluded. 
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The case selection process is somewhat easier for the Illinois sample 
because production is essentially limited to the corn, soybean and wheat 
enterprises. Hence, restriction three was met when the sample was selected. 
Of the 167 producers in the sample, 29 purchased land during the 1975-79 
period. Of these, 11 were considered nonusable because of frequent changes in 
land base resulting from leasing transactions. Additionally, 2 producers both 
purchased and sold land during this period. The result of applying selection 
restrictions three and four was a sample of 16 producers. 
Application of Hanson's restrictions one and two proved to be too 
restrictive for the sample of FBFM producers. Two of the land purchases were 
less than 40 acres. More problematic, however, was the restriction concerning 
farmers who had farmed the land previous to its purchase. This accounted for 
11 producers. Thus, by applying all restrictions, the number of observations 
was reduced to three. 
In order to retain a reasonable number of observations, we choose to omit 
restriction two and to modify restriction one to include 16 farms with 
purchase of more than 27 acres. Clearly, of these modifications the former 
has the greatest consequence for the conclusions of this study. Hanson has 
argued that the machinery complement does not have to be expanded in conjunc-
tion with land purchase if the land is already under operation by the producer 
and, hence, the land/machinery expansion unit is not properly recognized. 
However, if the lease was entered into just shortly prior to the purchase, 
part of the building and machinery deductions would still be available. 
Additionally, with the purchase of the land, the operator is able to allocate 
the basis of the property between real estate and depreciable assets, and thus 
capture some depreciation resulting from the purchase. 
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Modifications to TAXMODL 
Before the TAXMODL tax accounting model was applied to the FBFM data, 
several modifications were made. In the Hanson analyses, the identification 
of negatively taxed investments hinged on the ability to accurately allocate 
costs and receipts between the pre- and post-expansion land base. To 
accomplish this, the "homogeneous acre rule" was applied. As stated earlier, 
this is simply an allocation of expense and receipt items based on the propor-
tion of expansion acres to total acres after expansion. Because the FBFM 
sample was made up entirely of part owners, the TAXMODL cost allocation rules 
were modified such that the operator's real estate taxes were allocated only 
among the acres owned by the operator. Further, the cash interest allocation 
rule was modified to assume a maximum of 80 percent of the value of the expan-
sion was debt financed. A 100 percent leverage assumption was previously used 
in TAXMODL. Sensitivity analyses were employed to test for differences in the 
80 and 100 percent debt finance expansion rules. The differences were not 
important for the majority of the sample. 
The remaining assumptions of TAXMODL are left intact. Some of the more 
important of these are: 
1. Federal and state income tax provisions were incorporated into the 
model, explicitly representing the laws which were in effect during 
the time period of the data under study. 
2. Nonfarm income was not available in the producers' records and was 
assumed to be zero. 
3. A family size of four was assumed for all producers. 
4. The ~tandard deduction was used in state and federal income tax 
calculations. 
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Application of TAXMODL to the 16 FBFM producers indicates that expansion 
produced a negative tax change for individuals and a positive tax change for 
the remaining 9 producers. (Results by year for individual producers are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2.) However, of greater importance than the number in 
each of these groups is the magnitude of the changed tax liabilities. The tax 
changes for those individuals with negative adjustments in tax resulting from 
expansion were small relative to the group who realized increased taxes. 
Considering only the year in which the farm expansion occurred, tax changes 
(1977 dollars) ranged from -$2,285 to $9,451 (figure 1). Only 3 producers had 
an initial year negative tax change greater than $1,000. However, 8 producers 
realized a tax increase larger than $1,000. The means and standard deviations 
for the tax change measures by groups realizing positive and negative tax 
changes are presented in Table 3. 
The group with negative tax adjustment from expansion appears to differ 
from the tax increase group in several respects. The former group farmed more 
acres, owned an average of 40 acres more land, and had a substantially larger 
pre-expansion gross income than did the latter group (Table 3). The pre-
expansion gross income earned per acre also is larger for the negative tax 
group. This provides some evidence that this group does not realize negative 
tax changes simply because of poor physical performance. 
It is interesting to note that the relationship between average gross 
income, average operators taxable income, and allowable deductions appears to 
be substantially different for the two groups. Those who benefited from 
expansion by lowering their combined tax liability had gross earnings 58% 
larger than the positive tax group, but taxable income only 56% of the latter 
group. This was achieved of course by having substantially larger average 
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deductions. For example, the cash interest for the negative tax recipients 
was almost five times the same expense for the positive tax group. 
This disparity in income versus deductions for these two distinct groups 
raises a number of interesting questions. For example, does this indicate 
that the tax liability reduction incentive fosters the artifical inflation of 
operating costs, both variable and capital related? If the answer is yes, 
then what are the implications for other income support programs which are 
based on the cost of production? 
Statistical Analysis and Interpretation 
For the majority of producers in this sample, expansion of the land base 
results in increased tax liability. To help identify some of the factors 
associated (at least for this sample) with the magnitude of the tax changes 
resulting from expansion the following multiple linear regression models were 
estimated: 
Model I 
TAXDIF = -1488.32 + 0.08 RTI + 41.84 PEREXP 
Model II 
(-.76) (2.58) (3.17) 
-1.32 MCA -61.15 PEL 
(-0.18) (-2.84) 
R = 0.84 F = 14.37 DF 11 
TAXDIF = -1798.5 + 0.08 RTI + 43.66 PEREXP 
(-1.78) (2.74) (5.12) 
-64.03 PEL 
(-4.44) 
R = 0.84 F = 20.83 DF = 12 
Numbers in parantheses below the estimated coefficients are the t values. 
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TAXDIF is the tax change (sum of federal and state income taxes and the 
self employment tax) occurring in the expansion year. Because we are com-
paring purchases of land occurring in different years, all variables are 
expressed in constant 1977 dollars. RTI is taxable income for the expansion 
year. PEREXP is land expansion as a percentage of the pre-expansion owned 
land base (acres). MCA is the deductible exenses allocated to the expansion 
on a per acre basis. These expenses include depreciation, interest and 
investment tax credit. PEL is the pre-expansion leverage as measured by cash 
interest carried by the farm operation in the year prior to the expansion 
year, on a per acre basis. 
Two models were estimated because by looking at the summary data in Table 
3 it was apparent that the realization of tax reduction due to expansion was 
due to the relative size of real taxable income and allocable expenses. What 
was not clear was whether or not the expansion per se contributed to the 
magnitude of the allocable expenses or whether this was a pre-expansion attri-
bute. 
In Model I, both the leverage prior to expansion and the costs attribu-
table only to the expansion, on a per acre basis, were included as explanatory 
variables. The signs of the coefficients were as expected, however, the stan-
dard error of the MCA parameter estimate is very large. Thus, it appears that 
the cost associated with expansion acres, which includes interest, depre-
ciation and first year investment tax credits, is not influential in 
explaining variations in TAXDIF. 
In light of this, Model I was dropped in favor of Model II. This speci-
fication suggests that it is the per acre cash interest prior to expansion PEL 
which is most influential in explaining differences in tax liability changes. 
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Netting out the effects of RTI and PEREXP, a 10% increase in cash interest per 
acre results in a 9.1% decline in tax liability with expansion. 
This result has rather important implications for the negative 
tax/resource allocation debate. The evidence presented here suggests that the 
magnitude of the negative tax incentive is related to the debt service charge 
per acre on existing land rather than the allocable expenses, including 
investment credit, per acre of expansion land. This does not suggest, 
however, any reason related to the tax structure as to why some farms prior to 
expansion have high debt service charges per acre than others. It may well be 
that some farm firms, when faced with high gross income years over invest in 
machinery and other capital equipment and do so out of debt financing rather 
than equity financing. These farms are then in a position to realize negative 
tax effects from land expansion. Such an explanation, if correct, would focus 
our attention on the relationship between the tax structure and machinery 
expansion as the primary element and land expansion as a secondary effect. 
The partial effects of the explanatory variables PEREXP, PEL and RTI are 
illustrated in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 (panel a) illustrates graphically 
the estimated relationship between real tax change and PEREXP. The lower 
panel of this figure illustrates how PEREXP will shift the relationship 
between TAXDIF and RTI with PEL held constant. A similar set of relationships 
is presented in figure 3 for PEL. 
Conclusions 
A primary purpose of this study was to further test empirically the 
hypotheses of Hanson and others that farm expansion assets are negatively 
taxed. This was accomplished by application of the Hanson TAXMODL to a sample 
of Illinois FBFM cash grain producer records. Of the 16 individuals analyzed, 
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only 7 portrayed diminished taxes as a result of expansion. Further, the 
magnitudes of these tax savings were not large. The sample average in the 
year of expansion in real dollars was $769. The magnitude of tax change was 
greater for those individuals who realized a positive tax increment from 
expansion. The sample average increase in real terms was $3596. 
Descriptive statistics provided evidence that the groups with positively 
and negatively tax expansion were substantially different with respect to the 
degree of leverage employed in the expansion. Multiple linear regression 
techniques indicated that the positive tax change resulting from expansion was 
positively related to real taxable income, positively related to the relative 
size of the expansion unit, and negatively related to the amount of pre-
expansion debt service per acre of expansion. Direct costs per acre attribu-
table to the expansion including interest, depreciation and investment credit 
were not significant in explaining the changes in tax liability. 
There are several important limitations to these analyses. Obviously, 
the sample size is small, thus putting great weight on each producer's record. 
An additional concern, however, is the violation of Hanson's selection 
criteria; especially the restriction concerning farmers who purchased land 
previously farmed under a lease agreement. Indeed, if these farmers adjusted 
the machinery complement substantially prior to the land purchase, then we do 
not, as Hanson argues, have a true land expansion, but only a change of 
ownership of assets. If there is a strong positive relationship between the 
prior purchase of machinery and equipment and high per acre debt service then 
the results here may suggest a machinery-land expansion incentive. However, 
this is only suggestive as there is no way of testing for the prior correla-
tion in this data sample. 
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Finally, concern must be expressed about the revenue-cost allocation 
rules. The "homogeneous acres rule" included in TAXMODL may not be sophisti-
cated enough to recognize the true leverage involved in land purchases. Tax 
liability changes are generated in comparing expansion records with no expan-
sion by adjusting both the farms gross income and expenses to arrive at a non-
expansion taxable income. If the rule used to adjust income introduces a bias 
then the tax calculation will also be biased. 
In conclusion the results of our study do not completely support the fin-
dings of Hanson. We do find the existence of negative taxation in seven farms 
out of sixteen studied. However, the amount of tax liability reduction is 
relatively small while for the other nine farms who also expanded the increase 
in tax liability was substantially larger. We cannot conclude, however, that 
the evidence cited here supports the argument that negative taxation is a pri-
mary economic inducement to land expansion. There were notable disparities 
between those farms who experienced tax increases and those who experienced 
tax reductions. Most notable was the difference in gross income and taxable 
income for the latter group and the fact that this group had much higher debt 
service requirements per acre of operated farm land. The sample data were not 
robust enough to allow us to discern what the economic reasons were for these 
disparities. In recognition of the limitations of the data base, these 
results should be interpreted as suggestive as to the direction of future 
research in this area. Clearly, more work is required. Also, it is clear 
that data requirements for this type analysis are stringent. We would suggest 
that a coordinated effort needs to be undertaken to collect, on a diverse 
geographic basis if possible, producer information concerning land/machinery 
expansion. Such information will need to focus carefully on the adjustments 
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of receipts and deductible expenses resulting from expansion, and should pay 
particular attention to the magnitude and timing of the machinery and equip-
ment purchase decisions relative to land expansion. This would help to reduce 
the dependency of future analyses on the allocation of revenue-expense com-
ponents among enterprises and between pre- and post-expansion business 
organizations. 
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Table 1. Income,expense and tax Masures by year for producers with a tax decrease 
resulting from expansion. 
Obsenat ion 
1 2 3 4 
with without with without with without with without 
Measure expansion ex pan ion expansion expansion expansion expansion expansion expansion 
1975: 
Gross inco111e 67678 67678 99182 99182 131427 131427 106839 106839 
Cash interest 2091 2091 2913 2913 1326 1326 4902 4902 
Depreciation 10890 10890 21795 21795 21990 21990 15410 15410 
Other deductible exp. 24585 24585 42303 42303 92178 92178 47717 47717 
Income tax--federal 6811 6811 5067 5067 0 0 6141 6141 
Income tax-state 749 749 822 822 442 442 888 888 
Self employment tax 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 
1976: 
Gross income 92433 92433 114840 114840 194083 194083 103671 103671 
Cash interest 6297 6297 4066 4066 5940 5940 5093 5093 
Depreciation 13213 13213 25717 25717 27906 27906 18270 18270 
Other deductible exp. 36797 36797 46304 46304 128322 128322 60707 60707 
Income tax--federal 7213 7273 5282 5282 0 0 0 0 
Income tax--state 906 906 1037 1037 867 867 358 403 
Self employment tax 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 
1977: 
Gross income 76959 76959 103034 96284 186600 186680 147684 147684 
Cash interest 5371 5371 5989 0 1052 1052 11256 11256 
Depreciation 14376 14376 33057 30891 27734 27734 17710 17710 
Other deductible exp. 27777 27777 37677 34807 141526 141526 76288 76288 
Income tax--federal 3527 3527 2097 3138 0 0 3335 3607 
Income tax--state 720 720 657 714 417 417 972 972 
Stlf employment tax 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 
1978: 
Gross incoae 89611 89611 116873 109217 203427 190454 117353 117353 
Cash interest 5953 5953 15138 8385 9029 1446 9047 9047 
Dtpreciation 15294 15294 23913 22403 32593 30515 19745 19745 
Other deductible exp. 32195 32195 51614 47621 144749 135011 55556 55556 
Income tax--federal 8332 8332 5850 7001 0 0 3685 3685 
Income tax--state 864 864 796 863 428 551 745 745 
Self employment tax 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 
1979: 
Gross i ncotllf 95613 87645 121936 113948 250609 235166 107130 101316 
Cash interset 5632 0 16824 8970 18265 9446 10968 3009 
Depreciation 17557 16094 29433 27505 38261 35903 23490 22215 
Other deductible exp. 36839 33353 50179 46231 176323 164980 76104 71778 
Income tax--federal 2381 2610 128 1595 0 0 0 0 
Income tax--state 859 844 627 719 399 538 0 42 
Self employment tax 1855 1855 1855 1855 1609 1855 0 461 
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Table 1. Continued 
ObseriJation 
5 6 7 
with without with without with without 
Measure expansion expanion expansion expansion expansion expansion 
1975: 
Gross income 141811 141811 43608 43608 116755 116755 
Cash innterest 2639 2639 228 228 9575 9575 
Depreciation 20591 20591 9m 9m 21328 21328 
Other deductible exp. 54882 54882 17797 17797 46857 46857 
Income tax--federal 16687 16968 982 1218 0 0 
Income tax--state 1558 1558 368 368 925 925 
Self employment tax 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 
1976: 
Gross income 188805 188805 57244 53219 112926 112926 
Cash interest 13162 13162 491 0 15214 15214 
Depreciation 36710 36710 9453 8788 29231 29231 
Other deductible exp. 63927 63927 30583 28155 58615 58615 
Income tax--fedtral 19731 19731 2247 1883 0 0 
Inco.e tax--state 1809 1809 408 369 218 218 
Self employment tax 1209 1209 1209 1209 1004 1004 
1977: 
Gross income 136907 123271 65273 60683 122929 97153 
Cash interest 19651 6642 5062 1844 21994 0 
Depreciation 32004 28816 12290 11426 32213 25458 
Other deductible exp. 74727 66573 30931 28248 65958 51380 
Income tax--federal 0 1877 0 184 0 0 
Income tax--state 251 466 427 448 159 492 
Self employment tax 1110 1304 1304 1304 447 1304 
1978: 
Gross income 172468 155290 65973 61334 172711 137272 
Cash interest 24971 11524 3705 379 61924 30889 
Depreciation 30478 27442 13609 12652 32657 25956 
Other deductible exp. 70036 62153 29452 26871 67797 51668 
Income tax--federal 11702 12676 2294 2554 0 0 
Income tax--state 1108 1146 465 477 189 502 
Self employment tax 1434 1434 1434 1434 887 1434 
1979: 
Gross inCOIIle 167866 151146 76108 70757 191419 152135 
Cash interest 24861 9221 3791 0 64879 28784 
Depreciation 30516 27477 14893 13846 38234 30387 
Other deductible exp. 92164 82042 36093 33061 85722 65875 
Jncome tax--federal 1142 3966 2608 2900 0 0 
Income tax--state 498 720 533 554 34 507 
Self employment tax 1855 1855 1855 1855 433 1855 
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Table 2. Income, expense and tax measures by year for producers with a tax increase 
resulting from the expansion 
Observations 
1 2 3 4 
with without with without with without with without 
Measure exp'sn exp'sn exp' sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn 
1975: 
Gross Income 88607 88607 96296 96296 90291 90291 91801 91801 
Cash interest 3356 3356 0 0 0 0 501 501 
Depreciation 15510 15510 10985 10985 10974 10974 9957 9957 
Other deductible exp 38138 38138 27354 27354 32652 32652 24957 24957 
Income tax--federal 1656 1919 18995 18995 12839 12839 17082 17082 
Income tax--state 809 809 1440 1440 1127 1127 1334 1334 
Self employment tax 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 
1976: 
Gross Income 96674 96674 78643 78643 98382 90480 102903 76403 
Cash interest 2556 2556 0 0 0 0 360 0 
Depnoci ati on 14049 14049 12166 12166 13824 12714 12530 9303 
Other deductible exps. 49258 49258 26514 26514 30137 27396 34240 25108 
Income tax--federal 6163 6163 9962 9962 13402 9668 16149 5422 
Income tax--state 749 749 973 973 1286 1084 1342 727 
Self employment tax 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 
1977: 
Gross income 104958 83936 69505 57663 122921 113048 93452 69386 
Cash interest 2740 0 0 0 0 0 14507 967 
Depreciation 24065 19245 16302 13525 15718 14456 9676 7184 
Other deductible exp. 52959 42020 20573 16734 34117 30875 32195 22787 
Income tax--federal 2588 1019 3048 422 24922 19305 7186 4352 
Income tax--state 582 406 775 528 1827 1556 ass 645 
Self emplo,.ent tax 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 
1978: 
Gross income 119293 95364 70528 58350 96942 86738 93250 75530 
Cash interest 2506 0 0 0 0 0 11279 0 
Dtpr eci at ion 28304 22626 19233 15912 18046 16146 10734 8694 
Other deductible exp. 74674 59138 35693 29163 35082 30976 40642 31750 
Income tax--federal 0 0 1820 876 9164 5845 4940 4379 
Income tax--state 296 223 406 291 1036 826 685 630 
Self employment tax 1285 1047 1434 1266 1434 1434 1434 1434 
1979: 
Gross incOM 132685 118551 89148 73959 92873 83097 105617 85250 
Cash interest 1704 0 0 0 0 0 10914 0 
Depreciation 31062 27753 19160 15896 18826 16844 10125 8172 
Other deductible exp. 76760 67389 40784 33128 33241 29304 43330 33825 
lncome tax--federal 953 559 3477 1361 6366 3626 8555 6222 
Income tax--state 650 587 655 442 954 760 1013 855 
Stlf employment tax 1855 1855 1855 1756 1855 1855 1855 1855 
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Table 2. Continued 
Observations 
5 6 7 8 
with without with without wi th without with without 
Heasure exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn exp'sn 
1975: 
Gross ineo~~e 110702 110702 77058 77058 99731 99731 105346 105346 
Cash interest 6128 6128 177 177 1866 1866 2699 2699 
Depreciation 9900 9900 15421 15421 10018 10018 9151 9151 
Other deductible exp. 60400 60400 30580 30580 46478 46478 51100 51100 
Income tax--federal 7836 7836 2795 2795 "'11 9411 5580 5580 
lnc011 tax--state 913 913 689 689 953 953 1044 1044 
Self employment tax 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 
1976: 
Gross ineo~~e 152919 119918 79690 79690 99633 99633 109395 109395 
cash interest 19176 482 792 792 1839 1839 2664 2664 
Depreciation 10486 8223 12606 12606 9232 9232 12574 1~74 
Other deductible exp. 65210 50406 34752 34752 41311 41311 52612 52612 
Income tax--federal 13367 mo 5434 5434 13309 13309 10188 10788 
Income tax--state 1514 1255 699 699 1132 1132 981 981 
St lf employment tax 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 
1977: 
Gross incomt 152524 119608 92280 83624 90456 90456 97811 97811 
Cash interest 30256 11769 673 0 1751 1751 0 0 
Depreciation 17218 13502 13971 12661 9312 9312 14040 14040 
Other deductible exp. 54214 41104 35051 31535 35661 35661 44067 44067 
lnCOIIe tax-federal 18497 13917 9789 7017 10326 10326 8946 8946 
Income tax--state 1384 1151 974 802 1018 1018 936 93G 
Stlf emplo?~Dent tax 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 
1978: 
Gross income 144068 112776 105559 "'446 85460 75964 98029 98029 
cash interest 26068 6958 6398 730 7769 173 9 9 
Depreciation 10917 8546 18758 16783 10308 9163 12603 12603 
Other deductible exp. 56277 42597 34619 30671 38225 33720 46690 46690 
Income tax--federal 14673 11325 9049 7387 5049 5118 9260 9260 
Income tax--state 1343 1143 1050 940 648 651 904 904 
Stlf employment tax 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 1434 
1979: 
Gross income 145093 106850 131343 120412 99657 88584 118603 18899 
Cash interest 24896 2670 5619 0 1080 0 38 0 
Depreciation 22056 16243 19054 17468 8651 7690 12005 7986 
Other deductible exp. 59191 42375 57787 52391 49561 43737 67991 44898 
Income tax-federal 10298 8052 7453 6754 6297 5831 7441 1273 
Income tax--state 1031 896 1123 1060 769 735 886 355 
Self emplo?llfRt tax 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1473 
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Measure exp'sn exp'sn 
1975: 
Gross tncome 106415 106415 
Cash interest 28 28 
Dtpreeiation 14918 14918 
Other deductible exp. 33894 33894 
lneomt tax--federal 16811 16811 
Income tax--state 1364 1364 
Stlf employment tax 1114 1114 
1976: 
Gross i nc011e 97604 97604 
Cash interest 0 0 
Depreciation 11306 11306 
Other deductible exp. 30461 30461 
Income tax-federal 16862 16862 
Income tax--state 1306 1306 
Stlf llfiPloyment tax 1209 1209 
1977: 
Gross income 93913 93913 
Cash interest 0 0 
Depreciation 16421 16421 
Other deductible exp. 31585 31585 
In COlle tax--federal 9898 9898 
lneo~e tax--state 1060 1060 
Self employment tax 1304 1304 
1978: 
Gross tncome 101147 101147 
Cash interest 0 0 
Depreciation 11827 11827 
Other Deductible exp. 40289 40289 
Income tax--federal 12710 12110 
Income tax--state 1150 1150 
Self emplovment tax 1434 1434 
1979: 
Gross income 98351 87401 
Cash interest 208 0 
Depreciation 14270 12681 
Other deductible exp. 46984 41676 
JnCOIIe tax-federal 5683 3283 
Income tax--state 832 643 
Stlf employment tax 1855 1855 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for producers grouped by ne;ative and 
positive real tax change in the year of purchase~ 
Measure 
Owned Acres (Year Previous to expansion) 
Total Farm Acres (Year Previous to expansion) 
Size of expansion (Acres) 
Operator's Gross Income (Year previous to expansion) 
Operator's Taxable Income (Year of expansion) 
Cash interest (Year of expansion) 
Depreciation (Year of expansion) 
Other deductible expenses (Year of expansion) 
Average Tax Change (Year of expansion) 
Federal Income Tax 
State Income Tax 
Self Employment Tax 
Average Total Tax Change 
Number of Producers in Class 
.!,1 1977 dollars 
Producers with 
a tax decrease 
resulting from 
expansion 






11,238 6, 771 
25,049 9,554 
65,260 37,828 






a tax increase 
resulting from 
expansion 
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Figure 2. The effects of relative expansion size on the changed tax liability. 
a. PEL and RTI are held constant at their sample means. 
b. PEREXP as a shifter of TAXDIF = f(RTI) 
1. PEREXP 63.01 (sample mean) 
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Figure 3. The effects of pre-expansion leverage on the changed tax liability. 
a. PEREXP and RTI are held constant at their sample means. 
b. PEL as a shifter of TAXDIF = f(RTI) 
1. PEL = 24.19 (sample mean) 
2. PEL = 50 
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